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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES B. JOHNSTON, ) 
) 
) 
) 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
vs, 
MAUREEN H. SIMPSON and WAYNE 
SIMPSON, dba The Flight School, 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16859 
This was an action for: rescission of a written contract for the purchase 
and sale of an airplane and for restitution by defendants to plaintiff of the 
purchase price paid under the contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following a trial, without a jury, the court granted plaintiff's claim for 
rescission of the contract and directed defendants to make restitution to 
plaintiff in the sum of $41, 125, together with interest thereon at the rate of 
6 percent per annum from January 25, 1979--the date of rescission--to 
October 26, 1979--the date of trial. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, James B. Johnston, is the general manager of a retail 
store in Ogden, Utah. He became acquainted with the appellants, Maureen H. 
and Wayne Simpson, through his next-door neighbor, who was a flight 
instructor for the Simpsons. Upon the completion of his basic flight training 
program, respondent had several discussions with Maureen Simpson 
concerning the purchase of an airplane (Tr. 2). These discussions resulted 
in the execution of a retail purchase order on July 29, 1977, which provided 
that respondent would purchase a 1978 Cessna airplane from appellants for 
$41, 125. A down payment in the amount of $3, 000 was made and a second 
retail purchase order was executed by the parties on October 17, 1977 
(Tr. 25). The second agreement was essentially identical to the first. Para-
graph 5 of each retail purchase order provides that: 
Title to aircraft products herein sold and purchased shall pass to 
Purchaser when full purchase price shall have been paid to Dealer 
or upon Dealer's accepting other financial arrangements satisfactory 
to Dealer in lieu of full purchase price. All risk of loss shall be on 
Purchaser from and after receipt of possession of the aircraft 
products. 
On or about October 17, 1977, respondent tendered the unpaid balance 
of the purchase price to appellants and personally took delivery of the air-
plane at the Cessna facto~y (Tr. 16-17). On that date, two separate security 
interests were in effect against the subject airplane (Ex. 6P). The first was 
granted .by Skyways, Inc. (the regional distributor), to Cessna, Inc. (the 
manufacturer), through a security agreement dated October 14, 1977. The 
- 2 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
150 
release of this security interest was not filed of record until November 16 
' 
1977. The second was granted by Transwest, Inc. (the local distributor), to 
Skyways, Inc. , through· a security agreement dated October 17, 1977. The 
release of this security agreement was not filed of record until April 20, 1978 
(Ex. 6P; R 95). At the time of execution of the agreement, respondent had 
no knowledge of the existence of these outstanding security interests 
(Tr. 19-20). At about this time, respondent asked Maureen Simpson when he 
could expect to receive his certificate of registration of title from the Federal 
Aviation Administration (Tr. 5). She advised him that he would receive the 
certificate within 90 days from late October 1977 (Tr. 6). This was the 
customary length of time for a purchaser to receive a certificate (Tr. 32). 
Mrs. Simpson further advised respondent that she would undertake to submit 
the documents necessary to obtain the certificate to the FAA on respondent 1s 
behalf, since that was the established custom in the aircraft industry 
(Tr. 28). Respondent relied on her assurance (Tr. 9). 
The documents required by the FAA for the issuance of the certificate 
were a bill of sale between the appellants and respondent, a bill of sale 
between the appellants and their supplier, Trans-West Aircraft Sales, and an 
application for the issuance of a certificate of registration to the airplane in 
the name of the respondent (Tr. 29). Appellants' customary policy was to 
send the necessary documents to the FAA contemporaneously with receipt of 
the purchase price for the aircraft (Tr. 29, 30). However, in this instance, 
the necessary documents were never received by the FAA and appellants were 
unable to off er any corroborating evidence that the documents were, in fact, 
sent or any explanation as to why they were never received (Tr. 33-34). 
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Resp-ondent contacted Mrs. Simpson on December 14, 1977, to determine 
the status of his application for issuance of the certificate. Mrs. Simpson 
told him that the "paperwork had been filed and that it was in the process" 
(Tr. 6). Two more months passed, and respondent had not yet received the 
certificate, so he again contacted Mrs. Simpson--this time on February 9, 
1978. She again gave him the same answer (Tr. 6). As the appellants 
characterize it, it was at this point that they realized that there must be a 
"problem" in the issuance of the certificate, as opposed to a mere "delay" 
(Appellants' brief, p. 5). 
On April 13, 1978, respondent advised the owner and general manager of 
appellants' distributor of his difficulty in obtaining the certificate (Tr. 7). 
Soon thereafter, on April 20, 1978, Mrs. Simpson was again made aware of 
the problem (Tr. 7). Further entreaties were made upon her on July 9, 
1978, September 24, 1978, and October 26, 1978 (Tr. 7-8), and appellants 
continued to insist that the documents were being "straightened out" and 
resubmitted (Tr. 8). The net effect of appellant's inability to prepare the 
documents in a form acceptable to the FAA was that for two separate periods 
of time there were no valid pending applications on file. The first period was 
January 1, 1978, to March 28, 1978; the second, September 20, 1978, to 
February 21, 1979 (R. 94). A valid application for registration, or a 
certificate of registration, is required to use an airplane (deposition of 
Maureen Simpson, pp. 7-8; deposition of James B. Johnston, pp. 26-27). 
Appellants were not able to prepare the documents in a form acceptable 
to the FAA until February 21, 1979--almost one month after respondent gave 
his notice of rescission (Tr. 22). Mrs. ~impson testified that because the 
documents were improperly filled out, they would not be a part of the compu-
- 4 -
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ter record at the FAA (Tr. 37), and that it is this computer record that the 
FAA personnel customarily consult in responding to requests for information 
respecting the record owner of a particular aircraft (Tr. 48) . The paper 
files containing any applications for registration are not normally consulted 
(Tr. 48). 
Nearly 17 months after payment of the purchase price, respondent had 
still not received the certificate of registration promised to him by the 
appellants (Tr. 22). There was no registration in force on the airplane after 
September 20, 1978, which precluded fleet insurance coverage thereon 
(Tr. 11) and which precluded pledging the airplane as collateral to secure 
repayment of a loan (Tr. 12). Respondent's patience with the matter was 
exhausted, and on January 25, 1979, he gave notice of rescission (Tr. 9). 
After January 25, 1979, respondent flew the airplane "from time to time 
as a matter of keeping the oil lubricated and the mechanical parts of· it from 
drying out and becoming dama~ed by nonuse" (Tr. 13). A flight to 
California best accomplished that purpose (Tr. 15), and appellants' own 
expert testified that the flying of an airplane is not at all incompatible with 
preservation of an airplane (Tr. 68) . 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO 
CONVEY FREE AND CLEAR TITLE TO THE AIRCRAFT ON 
OCTOBER 17, 1977, AND TO PERFORM THEIR PROMISE TO 
PROMPTLY AND PROPERLY REGISTER AND RECORD 
RESPONDENT'S PURPORTED TITLE WITH THE FAA CONSTITUTES 
A BREACH OF WARRANTY OF TITLE. 
Appellant sellers' warranty of title is mandated by § 70A-2-312 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), which provides in material part: 
- !; -
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(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a 
warranty by the seller that 
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer 
rightful; and 
(b) the goods shall be. delivered free from af y s~curity 
interest or other lien or encumbrance o which the 
buyer at the time of contracting has no knowledge. 
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or 
modified only by specific language or by circumstances which give 
the buyer reason to know that the person selling does not claim 
title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right as 
he or a third person may have. (Emphasis added.) 
Under paragraph 5 of the retail purchase order contract, title was to 
pass to respondent when, the full purchase price was paid on October 17, 
1977. As noted above, on that date, two separate security interests were in 
effect against the subject airplane (Ex. 6P). The first was granted by 
Skyways, Inc. (the regional distributor), to Cessna, Inc. (the 
manufacturer), through a security agreement dated October 14, 1977. The 
release of this security interest was not filed of record until November 16, 
1977. The second was granted by Transwest, Inc. (the local distributor), to 
Skyways, Inc. , through a security agreement dated October 17, 1977. The 
release of this security agreement was not filed of record until April 20, 1978 
(Ex. 6P; R 95). At the time of execution of the agreement, respondent had 
no knowledge of the existence of these outstanding· security interests 
(Tr. 19-20). 
It is not disputed that these security interests were not foreclosed and 
respondent's possession and use were undisturbed. However, this factor is 
irrelevant, according to the Uniform Commercial Code, for the warranty is 
breached even absent adverse claim or dispossession. Such is noted in 
Comments 1 and 4 to § 2-312 of the Code: 
- 6 -
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1. Subsection (1) makes provision for a buyer's basic needs 
~ respect to a title which he in g?od faith expects to acquire by 
his purchase, namely, that he receive a good clean title transfer-
red to him also in a rightful manner so that he will not be exposed 
to a lawsuit in order to protect it. 
The warranty extends to a buyer whether or not the seller 
was in possession of the goods at the time the sale or contract to 
sell was made . 
The warranty of quiet possession is abolished. Disturbance of 
quiet possession, although not mentioned specifically, is one way, 
among many, in which the breach of the warranty of title may be 
established. 
The "knowledge: referred to in subsection l(b) is actual 
knowledge as distinct from notice. 
4. This section rejects the cases which recognize the 
principle that infringements violate the warranty of title but deny 
the buyer ~ remedy unless he has been expressly prevented from 
using the goods. Under this Article 11 eviction 11 is not a necessary 
condition to the buyer's remedy since the buyer's remedy arises 
immediately upon receipt of notice of infringement; it is merely one 
way of establishing the fact of breach. [Emphasis added.] 
As is stated in 67 Am. Jur, 2d, Sales, § 482: 
[T]he language of the Uniform Commercial Code supports the 
conclusion that the warranty is not merely a warranty against dis-
possession, nor against assertion of an adverse claim, but is an 
unqualified commitment by the seller of good title, rightful transfer, 
and freedom of the goods from any security interest, lien, or 
encumbrance. [Emphasis added.] 
This warranty of title, as the trial court found, was breached in two 
respects: (1) appeallants' failure to perform their promise to promptly and 
properly register and record respondent's purported title with the office of 
the Federal Avaiation Administration Registry prior to January 25, 1979; and 
(2) appellants' failure to convey title to respondent free and clear of two 
security interests granted in favor of certain third parties. 
\ 
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That the existence of these outstanding security interests is at odds 
with the notion of an unqualified commitment of good title can be seen from 
certain cases detailing the rights of prior unrecorded purchasers vis-a-vis 
the rights of subsequent secured parties. The contest between prior 
unrecorded purchasers (like respondent) and subsequent secured parties (like 
Cessna, Inc. , and Skyways, . Inc.) presents a situation where the policy 
favoring the purchaser is weak, since the subsequent secured party has or 
may have dealt on the faith of the record. 
This was recognized in Marsden v. Southern Flight Service, Inc. , 277 
· F . Supp . 411 (M. D . N. Car. 1964) . In that case, before the plain tiff buyer of 
an aircraft took possession and paid the full purchase price, defendant seller 
had granted two security interests in the airplane which were recorded with 
the FAA. At delivery, for full payment plaintiff buyer received a bill of sale 
and an application for FAA registration. These documents were turned back 
to the dealer on the dealer's assurance that he would see they were filed with 
the FAA. The dealer failed to do so. Other documents showing the plaintiff 
buyer as owner were filed with the FAA and were placed in the file, but in a 
relatively inaccessible portion of the file folder. The dealer then refinanced 
the plane, paying off the two prior mortgages and giving a new security 
interest to the refinancing lender and its assignee. A professional title 
search organization performed a title and lien search for the benefit of this 
refinancing lender and its assignee which showed only the two prior 
mortgages and title registered in the dealer's name. The refinancing security 
interest was filed with the FAA and the two prior security interests were 
released. Several months later, buyer's bill of sale was filed for recordation. 
- 8 -
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On these facts, the court held that the unrecorded buyer's title and his 
rights were subject to the refinancer's security interest, for the refinancer 
and its assignee had no actual notice from the non-title documents, Thus, 
because of the federal recording system which was determined to have 
superseded state law, an unrecorded buyer was dispossessed by subsequent 
parties who had dealt on the faith of the record title. 
In Dowell ~· Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal.3d 544, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1, 
476 P. 2d 401 (1970), plaintiff purchased an airplane for cash in full from an 
authorized dealer through a distributor. That distributor had assigned its 
security interest to Beech Acceptance Corporation; this assignment and 
security interest was recorded with the FAA. The vendor dealer promised to 
file the bill of sale with the FAA, but did not do so. The dealer also failed 
to pay Beech. Afterward, Beech and the distributor removed the plane from 
Dowell' s possession. On these facts, the California Supreme Court held that 
Dowell did not take free of the prior federally recorded security interest 
created by the distributor. The court concluded: 
[Section 1403 of the Federal Aviation Act] provides a comprehensive 
system of recordation the purpose of which is to bring order to the 
field of aircraft titles and to protect the holders of substantial 
property interests in aircraft. Neither of those purposes is served 
if we apply state law in a manner virtually ignoring the existence of 
the federal system. If prior recorded intere.sts are not protected 
against subsequent buyers who fail to search title, the federal 
policy in favor of the recordation of aircraft titles will be frustrated 
and subsequent purchasers in California will cavalierly decline to 
investigate title so as to avoid "actual notice" under Commercial 
Code section 9307. 476 P. 2d 405. 
It is worth noting here that appellants contend that respondent's interest 
is protected under § 70A-9-307(2) of the Utah Commercial Code. That section 
provides: 
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(2) In the case of consumer goods, a buyer [in the ordinary 
course of business] takes free of a security interest even though 
perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security interest, for 
value and for his own personal, family or household purposes 
unless prior to the purchase the secured party has filed a financing 
statement covering such goods. 
Scholarly authority and case law are unanimous in declaring that this 
section simply does not, and cannot, apply here. As one authority notes: 
Viewed from afar, 9-307(2) is like a mirage; it appears to apply in 
many circumstances to permit buyers to take free of prior perfected 
security interests. In fact it is a provision of narrow scope that 
deals almost exclusively with a relatively insignificant transaction, 
one in which one consumer sells used goods to another consumer. 
J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, p. 943 (West, 
1972). --
There is no dispute that appellants are dealers selling from inventory, not 
consumers selling from isolated private stock (appellants' brief, p. 2). And, 
there is no dispute that the aircraft at issue was, at the time of purchase, 
new, not used. 
A typical case interpreting § 9-307(2) is Everett National Bank v. 
Deschuiteneer, 109 N .H. 112, 244 A. 2d 196, 5 U. C. C. Rep. Serv. 561 (1968). 
There, the defendant purchased an automobile from a dealer. The dealer had 
allegedly purchased it from the debtor who had in turn given a security 
interest to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, who was the original financier, was 
attempting to enforce his security interest against the defendant purchaser 
who claimed the protection of § 9-307(2). The court held that § 9-307(2) 
would not protect the buyer in such circumstance since his seller was a 
dealer. Accord, New England Merchants National Bank v. Auto Owners 
Finance Co. , Inc. , 355 Mass . 487, 245 N . E . 2d 437, 6 U. C . C . Rep . Serv. 58 
(1969); Muir~· Jefferson Credit Corporation, 108 N.J. Super. 586, 262 A.2d 
- 10 -
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33 ;· 7 U. C, C. Rep, Serv. 273 (1970). As Professor Gilmore states, 
§ 9-307(2) applies only to sales "by amateurs to amateurs," G, Gilmore, 2 
Security Interests in Personal Property, , § 26 .12 at 716, 
Since § 9-307(2) does not apply to the instant case, appellants are rele-
gated to § 9-307(1), if at all, which provides: 
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection [a] of section 
70A-1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a person 
engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest 
created ~ his seller even though the security interest is perfected 
and even though the buyer knows of its existence, 11 (Emphasis 
added,) 
This section, by its very terms, provides that a buyer in ordinary course 
takes free only of security interests created ~ his seller. In the present 
case, the security interests were created not by appellants, but by other 
parties in the chain of distribution. Therefore, the negative implication is 
clear that the buyer in ordinary course takes subject to any security interest 
created by a party not his seller. The case law confirms this. National 
Shawmut Banky. James, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484, 4 U.C.C, Rep. Serv. 
1021 (1967); General Motors Acceptance Corporation y. Trovills, 43 Mass. 
App. Dec. 96, 6 U. C. C. Rep. Serv. 409 (1969), 69 Am.Jur. 2d, Secured 
Transactions, § 469. Therefore, appellants' assertion that respondent is 
afforded the protections of § 9-307 is unfounded and the fact remains that 
respondent's interest in the aircraft was subject to the security interests held 
by Cessna, Inc. (which was not released of record until November 16, 1977), 
and Skyways, Inc. (which was not released of record until April 20, 1978). 
The jeopardy to which respondent's interest was exposed is further made 
clear in Pope y. National Aero Finance Co., 236 Cal.App.2d 722, 46 Cal.Rptr. 
- 11 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
150f 
233 (1965). That case involved an action for conversion and unlawful 
detainer, thereby making it necessary for the plaintiff buyers to prove an 
ownership or possessory interest in the airplane. The court held against 
plaintiffs on the facts and went on to observe that as a result of the federal 
recording system for aircraft, even had the plaintiffs acquired an interest in 
the airplane on January 31, 1960, as alleged, their interest would not have 
been superior to that of the finance company under its chattel mortgage, 
which was exeucted and delivered by the dealer on J:anuary 20, but not filed 
for recordation until February 2. The court held that federal registration is 
necessary in order to have a valid claim and that the federal statutes preempt 
the field with respect to the effect to be given to instruments not recorded 
pursuant thereto. The court reasoned that, since the plaintiffs never 
recorded, even if they did have an interest in the airplane, they would not 
be entitled to priority over the finance company which did record. 
The crucial importance of recordation under the federal statute for 
validating an interest is made clear in James Talcott, Inc. ~· Bank of Miami 
Beach, 143 So.2d 657 (1962) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.). Talcott involved a 
contest between two chattel mortgagees. The court gave priority to the bank 
on the following facts: bank took its mortgage on the airplane on December 
5; Talcott took its mortgage on March 18; bank recorded its interest with the 
FAA on March 19; and Talcott recorded six months later. The court held· as 
follows: 
By the plain language of the federal statute, neither the 
bank's mortgage nor Talcott's mortgage were valid with respect to 
the aircraft, as against the other, until recordation with the 
Federal Aviation Agency, as neither party was grantee or privy to 
the grantee of the other or had notice of the other's mortgage lien. 
Thus, while Talcott holding the mortgage issued second was unaf-
fected by the existence of the earlier unrecorded mortgage--until 
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the latter was recorded--by force of the same statute Talcott's 
later mortgage was ineffective with reference to the aircr~ft against 
the holder of the earlier mortgage until Talcott should record its 
mortg~ge. [Citation omitted.] Therefore, the priorities were 
established when the bank recorded its mortgage prior to the time 
that the Talcott mortgage was placed of record. At 659 . 
Thus, recordation was essential to validate the underlying interest. Without 
it, the interest failed. See also Continental Radio Co. v. Continental Bank & 
Trust Co., 369 S. W. 2d 359 (Tex. Cir. App. 1963). 
In Dawson ~. General Discount Corporation, 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S. E. 2d 
653 (1950), it was held that an assignee of a vendor of an airplane; who had 
recorded his retention of title contract with~ the FAA shortly after the 
purchase, had title superior to that of defendant, who had purchased from 
the original vendee, but whose interest was not recorded. And, in Marshall 
y. Bardin, 169 Kan. 534, 220 P. 2d 187 (1950), the court stated that if an 
attachment creditor dealt on the faith of the recorded , title of the airplane 
showing title in his debtor, then he would prevail against a prior unrecorded 
purchaser's claim. These cases again demonstrate that validation of the title 
holder's interest requires recordation of that interest. An unrecorded 
interest will be inferior to a later recorded interest. 
Finally, the very case on which appellants place substantial reliance, 
State Security Co. ~· Aviation Enterprises, Inc., 355 F.2d 225 (10 Cir. 
1966), supports respondent's position that the state of the record at the FAA 
Registry is the decisive factor in assessing the respective rights of competing 
interest holders. In that case, the court, in fact, held that a chattel 
mortgage on an airplane was invalid as against a good-faith purchaser from 
the mortgagor. But, the reason it was found invalid--which appellants 
overlook in their brief--was because it was not recorded with the FAA. The 
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inference is strong that had that chattel mortgage been duly recorded with 
the FAA, the Tenth Circuit would have applied the teachings of Marsden, 
Dowell, Pope, Talcott, Dawson and Marshall, supra, to hold that the recorded 
interest prevailed over the purchaser's unrecorded interest, or, as applied to 
the instant case, that Cessna, Inc.' s or Skyways, Inc.' s recorded security 
interests were superior to respondent's unrecorded ownership interest. 
It cannot be too often stressed that up until April 20, 1978, or more 
than six months after execution of the agreement, Skyways, Inc. 's security 
interest was not released of record. Respondent's interest was not recorded 
until February 21, 1979, or seventeen months after execution of the agree-
ment and almost one month after the date of rescission; and, for most of the 
period after the date of execution of the agreement until February 21, 1979, 
the FAA records showed that the record owner of the airplane was the 
appellant Flight School, not the respondent (deposition of Maureen H. 
Simpson, p. 33; deposition of James B. Johnston, p. 30). Until April 20, 
1978, respondent's unrecorded ownership interest was inferior to· that of 
Skyways, Inc.'s recorded interest. From that date until February 21, 1979, 
his unrecorded interest was inferior to that of the appellant Flight School's. 
Even appellants' witness, Gene Baltachio, president of Sky West, Inc., 
acknowledged at trial that until November 20, 1977, his company was the 
record owner of the airplane and could have exercised all incidents of 
ownership with respect to the plane, such as pledging the plane as security 
for a loan (Tr. 64-67). The very real ability of Cessna, Inc., S~yways, 
Inc., and Transwest, Inc., at various times subsequent to execution of the 
agreement, to exercise rights of ownership inconsistent with those of 
respondent is absolutely incompatible with the requirement of the seller's 
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warranty of title, under the Utah Commercial Code, that the seller must 
provide an unqualified commitment of good title free from any security 
interest, lien or encumbrance. The existence of these various security 
interests in third parties and the absence of record proof of respondent's 
title, as promised by appellants, constitute a breach of the warranty of title· 
As a leading authority notes, "If the plaintiff buyer proves the defective 
title or the presence of a lien or encumbrance of which he had no knowledge 
at the time of sale, he will win." J. White and R. Summers, supra, at 
p. 300. The trial court recognized this in holding for respondent. 
II 
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT APPELLANTS' BREACHES OF 
WARRANTY OF TITLE CONSTITUTED A MATERIAL AND SUBSTAN-
TIAL BREACH OF CONTRACT SUPPORTING RESCISSION OF THE 
AGREEMENT. e. 
It is well settled that in order to justify the rescission of a contract, a 
breach thereof must touch the fundamental purposes of the contract. Accord-
ing to Williston, "[Rescission] is not permitted for a slight, casual, or tech-
nical breach, but, as a general rule, only for such as are material and 
willful, or, if not willful, so substantial and fundamental as to strongly tend 
to defeat the object of the parties in making the contract." 12 Williston on 
Contracts 188 (3d Ed. 1970). As this court recently noted in Polyglycoat 
Corp. y. Holcomb, 591 P. 2d 449 (Utah 1979), and quoting the authorities 
there cited: 
As a general proposition, a party to a con tract has a right of 
rescission and an action for restitution as an alternative to an 
action for damages where there has been a material breach of the 
contract by the other party. What constitutes so serious a breach 
as to justify rescission is not easily reduced to precise statement 
but certainly a failure of performance which 'defeats the very object 
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of the contract' or '[is] of such prime importance that the contract 
would not have been made if default in that particular had been 
contemplated' is a material failure. At 451. 
That a failure of, or defect in, the title of the seller to the property sold 
constitutes a ground for rescission by the buyer is well established. 77 
C.J.S. Sales, § lOO(c), p. 794; Tuft ~· Brotherson, 106 Utah 499, 150 P.2d 
384 (1944); Koscove ~. Brunger, 143 Colo. 354, 352 P. 2d 961 (1960); Maloney 
~. Houston, 51 Cal. App. 585, 197 P. 661 (1921). As the court noted in 
Tuft: 
That one may lawfully agree to sell either personal or real property 
to which at the time he has no title cannot be questioned, and the 
want of title furnishes· no ground for rescission unless, upon 
tender, defendant is unable to comply with the agreement. At 386. 
The trial court properly recognized that appellants' breach of its 
warranty of title constituted a material and substantial breach of the parties' 
agreement which justifies the remedy of rescission. 
III 
RESPONDENT'S USE OF THE AIRPLANE AFTER HIS NOTICE OF 
RESCISSION WAS FOR MAINTENANCE AND PRESERVATION OF THE 
AIRPLANE AND DOES NOT BAR THE REMEDY OF RESCISSION. 
After giving notice of rescission on January 25, 1979, respondent flew 
the airplane to ensure that it did not become damaged through nonuse 
(Tr. 13). By doing so, he complied with the duty imposed upon him by 
§ 70A-2-602(2)(b) of the Utah Commercial Code. That section provides: 
(b) if the buyer has before rejection taken physical posses-
sion of goods in which he does not have a security interest under 
the provisions of this chapter (subsection [3] of section 
70A-2-711), he is under a duty after rejection to hold them with 
reasonable care at the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to 
permit the seller to remove them . 
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Reasonable care here required more than simply walking away from the 
airplane and subjecting it to a condition of disuse. As appellants' own expert 
testified, three to four months of disuse should not hurt the airplane 
(Tr. 58). The clear negative implication is that disuse beyond that point can 
result in harm to the airplane. . That is what respondent sought to avoid· 
The law is clear that in an action for rescission, "the goods returned or 
tendered must be in substantially the same condition as when the buyer 
received them tr 78 C. J. S . , Sales, § 503, p . 172. The record is 
utterly devoid of any evidence respecting actual condition of the airplane 
subsequent to the notice of rescission. Respondent's prime purpose was to 
preserve the plane, and there is not a shred of evidence which indicates he 
fell short of attaining that purpose. 
Finally, it should be noted that the cases cited by appellants in support 
of their argument, Porter y. Porter, 577 P. 2d 111 (Utah 1978), and Buehner 
Block Co. y. Glezos, 6 Utah2d 226, 310 P.2d 517 (1957), in no way stand for 
the proposition that use contrary to a purported rescission bars the remedy 
of rescission. Porter is a divorce case addressing issues of jurisdiction and 
visitation. Buehner is an implied partnership and mechanics' liens case 
addressing issues not remotely pertinent to the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants breached their warranty of title owed to respondent in two 
respects: first, they failed to convey title to respondent free and clear of 
two security interests granted in favor of certain third parties, as agreed; 
and, second, they failed to perform their promise to promptly and properly 
register and record his purported title with the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion Registry, as agreed. 
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The existence of the outstanding security interests against the airplane 
on the date of execution of the agreement violated the clear terms of para-
graph 5 thereof. The failure to register the purported title resulted in 
placing the record title to the airplane in the names of third parties and not 
in the name of respondent. These two sets of facts are absolutely 
incompatible with appellants' warranty of title which required them to provide 
an unqualified commitment of good title free from any security interest, lien 
or encumbrance. 
The court properly found that appellants' commitment to respondent was 
something less than unqualified. The judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this 5th day of May, 1980. 
Joh . T. n erson 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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Frank S. Warner 
WARNER & WIKSTROM 
543--25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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